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ACCIDENT No. .

REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT 11.001 11 (1) Place ... AAF Station 128 (2) Date 4 December 1944 (3) Time 1038 (5) F No. 45-38780 (6) Station AAP S (8) 584th Bomb Gp (6) 544th Bomb Sq AIRCRAFT: (4) Type and model B-17Gy AAF Station 106 Organization: (7) 3th AP (Oroup) PERSONNEL () NAME (Last name first) AIR FORCE OR COMMAND PERSONNEL CLAM BERIAL NO. RESULT TO PERSONNEL RATINO BRANCH DUTT (13) (14) 0819786 Sth 1st Lt FII PREDVAN, PETER P HI MI Bth Mil BAKER, DALE R 0768408 2nd Lt CP 8th MIL MII 1-127417 F/0 CALMITZ, JEROME (NWI 32905863 Bth YII IH FG Blaker, Bernard (NMI S/Sgt 8th TIL MII 36834301 S/Sgt TG Northrop, Robert L Sth AII III RO Nieters, George H 17073925 T/Bgt MIL HI 8th TOG Curtin, Paul R 32929815 8/8gt 1/8gt MII 38 8th MI Schuls, Russell L 19164757 Work, Robert E 8th 17088478 (21) 0819786 FREIMAN PETER (Middle initial) (28) AAF Station 106 Original rating (33) Pilot (34) 7 Jan 44 Present rating (35) Pilot (34) 7 Jan 44 Instrument rating (37) (Date) FIRST PILOT HOURS: 0.12-(at the time of this accident) 141:35 11:30 ... (42) Instrument time last 6 months... (38) This type..... 8:00 141:35 (39) This model... (43) Instrument time last 30 days.... 141:35 (44) Night time last 6 months.... (46) Last 90 days 354:10 (45) Night time last 30 days. private is --AIRCRAFT DAMAGE DAMAGE (49) LIST OF DAMAGED PARTS Salvage (46) Aircraft. (47) Engine(s)... (48) Propeller(s). 1/10 Cloud at 2500 ft. Vis 4 miles. Wind SW 24 mph. Slight ground (50) Weather at the time of accident (51) Was the pilot flying on instruments at the time of accident
(52) Cleared from AP Station 106 (53) To AP St Crash Landed (56) Nature of accident ... Loss of #1 and #5 engines. 100% mechanical failure. (57) Cause of accident ...

Form 54 has see been submitted....

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT

(Brief narrative of accident. Include statement of responsibility and recommendations for action to prevent repetition)

- 1. Statement from the Pilot gives a good narrative of the accident. It is the decision of the accident committee that No 5 engine was lost due to mechanical failure, and in keeping the fully loaded aircraft airborne, with No 5 prop windmilling causing vibration, it was necessary to use excessive power settings on the remaining three engines. (Due to this, No 1 engine was lost and feathered out and the remaining engines kept cutting out.) At this time pilot was headed for landing runway at Deemethorpe, and when No 1 engine quit, it was necessary to crash land in open field about 3/4 of a mile short of the runway. Pilot did a good job of crash landing considering aircraft was fully loaded.
 - 2. Pilot not held responsible 100% mechanical failure.
 - 5. No recommendations.

E.W. BROWN,

Lt Col., Air Corps, Air Executive.

E.I. WILMED,

Major, Medical Corps, Station Surgeon. D.E. SILVER, Lt Cole, Air Corps, Operations Officer.

W.B. FRY, Major, Air Corps, Group 8-2 Officer.



Signature (Investigating/Officer)

R.L. STELLER,

Captain, Air Corps.

No SOS USAPPIA-43/344/30404

544TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) AAF Office of the Operations Officer

4 Desember 1944

STATEMENT BY 1ST LT PETER P. FREIMAN, PILOT, CONCERNING CRASH LANDING ACCIDENT OF B-17G, 43-38750, ON 4 DECEMBER 1944:

"I was flying # 1 position of High Element of Low Squadron at about 13,000 feet when # 1 cylinder of # 3 engine blew off. We were in a climb at the time. I tried to feather # 3 engine immediately, but could not. The plane began to vibrate badly. Went through feathering procedure, swinging out of formation to the right. Was losing 1,000 feet per .mnute; so I lowered rate of decent to about 500 feet per minute. Got Navigator and Togglier out of nose. Navigator told me we were a little past Leicester; so I swung toward homefield. Co-pilot took over while I took exygen mask off and put on head set. Took over ship which was still vibrating, and # 3 prop was about 22' J RPM, and I couldn't feather it. Right landing wheel dropped down everytime Co-Pilot brought it up; so he kept it up with switch up. Came to vicinity of field on radio compass. Togglier put pins back in bombs. Manifold pressure went down granually to about 35". Turbos came back on. Saw home field, and Co-Pilot tried to contact "Cherub" with no success. Radio compass went out in meantime. Turbos went out. Manifold pressure was about 30" with full throttle and turbos on full. Losing altitude all the time. Lost sight of field and spotted DEENTHORPS and contacted it on 6440 with a "Mayday". They OK'ed me to come in on runway 23. Was between two and three thousand feet, and the Co-pilet was trying to get more manifold pressure. Engines were smoking most all the way down. I was on downwind leg then; so swung around for a larding. Put wheels down while on final approach. Waist gunner saw flames and black smoke out of # 1 engine | Saw bluish grey smoke coming out of cowl flaps; so I feathered i lengths. I was about 600 feet at the time, and # 3 was still windmilling. Able to get about 30" manifold pressure only. "old crew to prepare to crasm land, previously. No. 4 engine increased smoking. Shortly after, the two remaining engines cut out. Told crew to take crash landing positions. Co-pilot pulisd up the wheels. No. 2 and # 4 engines tried to come back several times, but didn't. So set plane down in open field short of runway about threequarters of a mile with gas load and full bomb load. No one on cree was injured. Flight control officer at DEENTHORPS reported seeing smoke on one of my engines while I was coming in for landing. While assembling and in formation, did rut exceed SOP ranges. All gauges did not exceed allowable limits."

> PETER P. FRIMAN, 1st Lt., Air Corps, Pilot.

514TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) AAF Office of the uperations Officer

4 December 1944

STATEMENT BY 2nd Lt DATE R. BAKER, CO-PILOT, CONCERNING CRASH LANDING ACCIDENT OF 8-17G, 43-38750, ON 4 DECEMBER 1944:

"No. 1 cylinder head, cylinder and pieces of cowling on # 3 engine stated started flying off while we were flying in formation. We were climbing at the time. Altitude was 13,000 feet, air speed 150, 2300 RPM, and 36" manifold pressure. Left formation and tried to feather prop. It would not feather. The windmilling prop caused a lot of vibration throughout the ship. The right wheel kept comign down, and I kept retracting it. After we had dropped down to about 6 or 8 thougand feet, we trice to increase power and discovered we could only get about 35" of pressure. Changed amplifiers, but this did not help. Changed inverters, and that did not help. Meansize the three engines were throwing off quite a bit of grey smoke. We came back towards field w. Radio Compass. About the time our manifold pressure went out the radic compass went out. We were losing altitude with low manifold pressure; so we headed for the nearest field which was DEENTHORPE. We called Deenthorpe and told them we were going to have to land. We were on the downwind leg of runway 23 and turned so the final approach, losing stitude all the time. When we were lines, up on the final approach the waist gurner called and said # 1 engine was on fire; so the Pilot feathered it. We were at about 600 feet at the time. I saw we were not going to make the field; so I put the wheels u. In the meantime # 2 and # 4 engines seemed to quit, catch, quit, then catch again. By this time we were so less there was nothing to do but hand ina plowed field about three-quarters of a mile from end of runway. The cylinder head temperature on any one engine did not exected 200. We never went over SOP manifold pressure. I do not know why we could not get more manifold pressure or why the two good engines quit on the final appreach.

> Hale M. Dafa, DALE R. BAKER, 2nd Lt., Air Corps, Co-Pilot.

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544TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) AAP Office of the Operations Officer

4 December 1944

STATEMENT BY T/SGT RUSSELL L. SCHULZ? AERIAL ENGINEER, CONCERNING CRASH LANDING ACCIDENT OF B-17G, 43-38750, ON 4 DECEMBER 1944.

"Before we took off, I watched the pilot and co-pilot go through the procedure of checking the engines. Each checked O.K. We were flying at 13,000 feet in formation, when all of a sudden # 1 cylinder of # 3 angine blew off. The pilot tried to feather prop but to no avail. The windmilling prop caused excessive vibration to the plane. With one engine out I thought we could make it to our base. Since there was danger of the prop coming off and driving through the nose, the navigator and togglier were sent back to the waist. Our pilot tried to rely on radio compass, but it was out and inaccurate. While making a 3600 we spotted field which was DEENTHORPE. As we approached the field, # 1 engine developed a fire, and it was immediately feathered, which put out the fire. At this time we were around 500 feet making our approach to the field. With two engines out. I thought we could make it with comb and gas load. The pins were replaced in the bombs. As we continued our glide the engines dost their boost and seemed to cut out occasionally. Waist gunner reported one of the remaining engines on fire. By this time we were at least three miles from the field; so the pilot decided to crash-land the plane. The pilot spotted a; plowed field, and with wheels up, he made a landing. The ship was denolished, but wone of the crew was injured.

> RUSSELL L. SCHUIZ, T/Sgt., Air Corps, Aerial Engineer.

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HEADQUARTERS 401ST BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Engineering Officer AAF Station 128

APO 557 31 December 1944

SUBJECT: Accident of Aircraft B-17G 43-38750.

TO : Group Operations Officer, AAF Station 128.

- 1. On 4 December 1944, the undersigned, in an unofficial capacity, made a cursory visual inspection of the four engines on B-17G aircraft 43-38750.
- 2. It was observed by the undersigned that the No. 3 engine on the aircraft had its No. 1 cylinder torn off and the master connecting rod and several articulating rods were severed. It appeared that the master rod had torn through the No. 1 cylinder barrel.
- 3. The No. 1 engine showed evidence of excessive oil in the upper segments of the exhaust collector ring. This oil in evidence was probably caused by the loss of the seal between the firing chamber and crankcase section (i.e. piston failure or piston ring failure) in one or more cylinders of the engine, thus allowing oil from the crankcase section to enter firing chamber and go out through the exhaust port of the cylinder. On the top side of the nacelle and wing there was a film of oil that appeared to have come from the crankcase breather. There was no evidence of a fire having occurred in the engine accessory section.

4. Engines Nos. 2 and 4 also showed evidence on the top side of the nacelle and wing of having disgorged oil spray out the crank-case breather.

FLANK E. WILSON, Capt., Air Corps,

Asst. Group Eng. Officer.

HEADQUARTERS AAF Station 128. AFO 557 Office of the Flying Control Officer U.S. Army

4 December 1944

SUBJECT: Aircraft Accident Involving B-17-G, #43-38750.

- TO : Group Operations Officer, 401st Bomb Group (H), AAF Station 128, APO 557, U.S. Army.
- 1. In compliance with 1st Bomb Division Instruction No. 57-3, dated 16 October 1944, subject, "Accident Statement by Flying Control Officer," the following report is herewith submitted on crash landing, involving B-17-G, #43-38750.
- 2. At 1030 hours, 4 December 1944, an aircraft bearing the call-sign "Clinker D-Dog" was heard calling "Mayday" on 6440 K.C. Contact was maintained with the aircraft, the pilot stating that he would have to land immediately. The aircraft was instructed to land on runway #28, the runway in use, but the pilot stated he would attempt to land on runway #23, on a straight-in approach. While on approach to runway #23, the pilot stated that he could not make the runway, and would crash land, doing so about one thousand (1000) yards from the Northeast corner of the airfield.
- 3. Crash crew and ambulances were dispatched immediately and all concerned were notified by conference crash alarm. There was no fire as a result of the crash and no members of the crew were injured.
- 4. At the time of the accident the runway in use was #28, the surface wind was West at twenty-four (24) miles per hour, there was no low cloud, and the visibility was four (4) miles. The sirfield was last inspected at 0900 hours. 4 December 1944.

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Charles E. Baldwin, Jr., CHARLES E. BALDWIN, JR., Major, Air Corps, Senior Flying Control Officer.

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