SUBJECT:    Frankfurt Raid, Division Air Commander's Narrative.

TO:                 Commanding General, 1st Air Division.

1.       Assembly and climb of the leading (40th) Combat Wing was without incident until an altitude of 20,500 feet when high cloudiness was encountered.  In order to prevent the high group from entering the cloud formation the climb was stopped, however the formation continued on the briefed course until in the clear again where the climb was resumed.  Departure from the English coast at Felixstowe was on time but at 3500 short of the briefed altitude.

2.       The Air Division assembly was accomplished enroute to the coast of Holland with the 41st Combat Wing abreast on the left and the 1st Combat Wing on the right and approximately ten (10) miles to the rear.  At approximately mid-channel the 1st Combat Wing Air Commander requested the position of the Air Div­ision and was informed that the Division was on course and climbing.

3.       Rendezvous with escorting fighters was accomplished as briefed at the hostile coast and excellent cover was provided to the limit of fighter range.  It is the writer's opinion that fighter cover during the entire mission was of a superior quality.  No improvement can be suggested.

4.         Mild evasive action was taken from flak areas during both penetration and withdrawal and as a result no flak bursts were observed within one mile of the formation although many bursts were observed.

5.         Penetration beyond range of fighter escort was without incident until reaching the Rhine at which time the formation was approximately five (5) miles south of course, and turn left was made toward the I.P.  The navigators indicated that the I.P. had been reached and turn was made toward the target.

Flares were fired and I.P. announced over VHF.  As the formation proceeded the undersigned, who had a large scale map of the area, observed that the approach was being made on Wiesbaden instead of Frankfurt.  This was passed to the bombardier and navigators over interphone and the formation turned left toward the briefed I.P.  Announcement was made over VHF that the leading Combat Wing had selected the wrong I.P. and was changing course toward the proper target.  Another flare was fired and the proper I.P. announced over VHF.  The confusion was due to the attempt of the navigator to navigate to the I.P. by visual means.

6.      Enemy opposition over the target and beyond was quite heavy.  Flak was very accurate, the lead ship being hit several times and flew through several clouds of smoke from bursts ahead.  Enemy fighters attacked after the turn away from the target and a running fight of about thirty (30) minutes ensued.  Only a few attacks were pressed home with fighters going through the formation.

7.        After leaving the target the lead pilot was instructed to make “S” turns to allow reassembly of Combat Wings and to close up the Air Division in order to take advantage of fighter support on withdrawal.  The friendly fighters were encountered as briefed and no more enemy fighters were observed.

8.      Return to base was without incident with the exception that several aircraft were forced to descend at the enemy coast due to oxygen shortage.

9.  Recommendations:  That lead navigators dead reckon and use accurate timing from the last positively identifiable geographic check point to the I.P., and not attempt to use pilotage to a pin point.

BUDD J. PEASLEE,

Colonel, Air Corps,

Chief of Staff.